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Introduction 
Since 2001, no other subject has influenced the political agenda more than political extremism 
and violence. The tragic events of 9/11 made it dramatically clear that civil strife and disrupted 
states represent not only a major humanitarian concern but also a significant threat to regional 
and global security. Recent events such as the London bombings in July 2005 suggest that the 
topic will be high on the political agenda for many years to come. Even under highly optimistic 
counterterrorism scenarios, terrorism is likely to remain a significant threat for several years to 
come.  
The recent focus on transnational, terrorism and religious extremism among policy-makers, the 
media, and many scholars in Western countries is understandable. However, it is important to 
note that the actual realities in many regions of the world vary greatly in the forms of political 
extremism that they face. These realities range from militant protest to open insurgency, and from 
nationalist separatism and resource wars, to government repression, electoral violence and 
violence in the gray zone between organized crime and politics. While much attention has been 
given to the menace of transnational religious terrorism, most of the violence experienced in the 
post-Cold War era was not due to the transnational terrorism that rudely awakened the OECD 
countries from their dream of a peaceful ‘end of history.’ Instead, it was connected to the 
proceedings in Chechnya, Palestine, Rwanda, Congo, Sudan, Columbia and other zones of 
permanent violence.[2]  
In view of the current debates about military and non-military components of counter-terrorism, 
peace-building, post-conflict reconstruction, and stabilization in countries torn apart by civil strife 
and disrupted states, the Bertelsmann Transformation Index 2006 includes a special report on 
political extremism and violence in 119 countries. This report provides an overview on the results 
of this survey and the underlying country assessments which analyze each individual country in 
detail. The data of the BTI 2006 country surveys on political extremisms and violence have been 
supplemented by data from the Heidelberg Institute on International Conflict Research (HIIK) 
Conflict Database and the RAND/MIPT Terrorism Knowledge Database.  
Global Patterns of Political Violence 
According to data from HIIK, in 2004 there were 145 intrastate political conflicts in 78 countries. 
The breakdown of conflicts by level of intensity illustrates that a total of 34 conflicts were carried 
out with a massive amount of violence. Forty three conflicts were categorized as crisis, meaning 
violence was sporadic. In contrast there were 68 non-violent conflicts.  
Figure 1: Global Patterns of Conflict 
 
Note: The HIIK annual Conflict Barometer segregates five levels of conflict intensity. Latent 
conflicts (level 1) and manifest conflicts (level 2) are below the threshold of use of violence; a 
crisis (level 3) is a situation where at least on of the involved conflict parties uses violence in 
sporadic incidents; severe crises (level 4) are characterized by the repeated use of violence in an 
organized way, whereas in wars (level 5) violence is used continuously in an organized and 
systematic way and the extent of destruction is massive. Source: HIIK conflict database. 
Concerning the general trends in violent conflict and terrorism in the 119 countries reviewed in 
the Bertelsmann Transformation Index, the data reveal two areas of deepening political violence 
since 2001: Asia and North Africa and the Middle East. Comparatively, the number of conflicts in 
East-Central and Southeast Europe has declined. In Latin America and Africa the frequency of 
conflicts has changed only slightly. Both in 2001 and 2004, the most sensitive area for violent 
conflict was Asia followed by the Near and Middle East and Central-West Africa, the later being 
the major conflict-zone around the globe in 2001.   
Figure 2: Regional Patterns of Conflict in 2004 
 Source: HIIK conflict database. 
The most violent conflicts in 2004 were to be found in Sudan, Iraq and the Congo. The explosion 
of communal violence and religious extremism in Iraq, the large-scale genocide in Darfur, the 
devastating civil wars in Congo, Nepal and Ivory Cost, civil unrest in Haiti, deepening violence in 
Thailand’s southernmost provinces, mass casualty terrorism in Russia, and state-sponsored 
terrorism by the government of President Robert Mugabe in Zimbabwe were among the most 
worrisome trends in political violence and extremism in the years 2001-2004. 







Crisis  Severe Crisis  Civil War  
Iraq          ?  ?  
Sudan          ?  ?  
Congo             ?  
India ?  ? ? ?  ? ? ? ?  ? ? ?     
Indonesia ? ? ?  ?  ?  ? ? ?     
Columbia ?        ? ? ?     
Somalia          ? ?     
Burundi       ? ? ?  ?     
Philippines ?  ?  ?  ?     
Russia    ? ? ?     ?     
??? = Number of conflicts. Source: HIIK conflict database. 
While these conflicts dominate contemporary headlines and suggest that the world has become 
less secure, the ebbs and flows in violent conflicts around the world also reveal some positive 
trends. In fact, compared to 2001, the global magnitude of extremely violent conflicts (war) has 
actually declined.[3] Ethno-nationalist wars for independence, which were the main threat to 
security and development in the past decade, have been reduced. Repression and political 
discrimination against ethnic minorities, although still a part of daily life in many transformation 
countries, diminished in scope and intensity, particularly in Eastern Europe. Although the 
challenges are daunting and the risks of future high-casualty terrorist acts, genocide and political 
mass murder remain real, developments over the past four years in former civil war or genocide 
countries such as the Kosovo, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Bosnia and Cambodia, and conflicts in Aceh, 
Macedonia, Serbia & Montenegro, Guinea, and the Chad, document that peace-building and 
post-genocide reconstruction is making progress in some countries.  
A closer inspection of conflict items during the review period of the BTI 2006 underlines the 
recent shifts and continuities in the global patterns of conflict. On the one hand, the frequency of 
autonomy and separatist conflicts, as well as those about access to government power has 
declined. On the other hand, the number of conflicts in which political extremists aim to create a 
religiously legitimized political order is increasing. Conflicts in which ethno-nationalist, economic 
and power-related interests are strongly mixed have also increased. Minority conflicts, although 
mostly non-violent, shape the patterns of conflict in Eastern Europe. In West and Central Africa, 
conflicts about access to political power and exploitation of economic resources overshadow 
other causes of conflict. Differences in Weltanschauung (worldview) are an exception and do not 
have a strong impact on the broader patterns of conflict in this region. 
Figure 3: Global Pattern of conflict items, 2001-2004 
 
Source: HIIK conflict database.  
Violence employed by extremists in order to fulfill their ideological goals is also not a general 
feature of East and South Africa; however, some of the countries have a potential for political 
extremism. Existing rebel movements such as those in Angola and Ethiopia do not threaten the 
stability of the state systems. In Uganda, one of the region’s hotbeds of civil war in the past, civil 
war between government troops and the vaguely Christian-fundamentalist Lord’s Resistance 
Army (LRA) created a humanitarian disaster in the north. A number of rebel groups possess a 
capability to cause instability in the outer provinces; however, the government has effectively 
confronted these insurgencies through a mixture of forceful counterinsurgency strategies, 
negotiation and foreign diplomacy.[4] The stubborn policy of President Mugabe in Zimbabwe 
increasingly resembles state terrorism against the opposition and the ethnic group of the Ndebele. 
Although it seems unlikely at this moment, future government repression in the long-term may 
cause counter-violence by some opposition groups. 
Global Patterns of Terrorism 
There is little agreement on the meaning of the term ‘terrorism.’ There are virtually hundreds of 
definitions of terrorism, and there is no consensus of opinion as to which is the most relevant 
one.[5] The two most common ways of defining terrorism—labeling as a particular non-state 
enemy by a government and the ‘scientific approach’ of defining terrorism by its method 
(indiscriminate or disproportionate use of violence against civilian targets)—are both 
unsatisfactory. While the first approach is entirely arbitrary and a matter of political intention and 
will, the second approach faces the problem that according to the criteria, some of what has been 
tolerated and sometimes celebrated in international society, such as the armed anti-Apartheid 
struggle by the ANC in the 1980s, falls in this category as well. Furthermore, guerillas waging 
revolutionary warfare often use terrorist tactics, even though the contemporary escalation of 
terrorism has mainly been utilized by non-state actors engaged in terrorism without guerrilla 
warfare.[6]  
The events of September 11, 2001 have only added to the general confusion about the term and 
reinforced a tendency, particularly on the part of policy makers and the media, to use terrorism as 
an umbrella term for all sorts of violent activity—from criminal to punitive—as well as for various 
forms of political extremism and asymmetrical warfare.[7] In this analysis, the most standard 
definition of terrorism provided by Kaplan and Schulte is employed: “Terrorism is the use of 
violence or force, or the threat of such, directed upon innocents, civilians, or noncombatants, in 
order to achieve political objectives.”[8] Of course, this definition implies nothing about whether an 
act of terrorism can be justified or not. It has its own conceptual issues, for example the fact that 
this definition automatically excludes open military actions or systematic repression up to mass-
murder of its own people by a government.  
As mentioned in the introduction, the GWOT is at the top of the agenda in several western 
countries, but in other parts of the world, this topic has been set aside, due to overwhelming 
internal issues. Furthermore, often the extremists and perpetrators of human rights violations are 
not to be found in society, but in the state and government. The cynical abuse of power by 
privileged elites, corruption and the scramble for resources by politicians, military leaders and 
business elites alike have fed and prolonged military conflicts, particularly in the conflict zones of 
Central Africa and Southeast Asia. In addition, arms-trade, drug production and trafficking, and 
the exploitation of gemstones, timber, oil, minerals or other natural resources have contributed to 
the onset, duration, and intensity of many violent conflicts, leading to a vicious circle of conflict 
and despair.  
However, religious extremism and terrorism has deepened in South and Southeast Asia, and, 
particularly, in North Africa and Middle East (MENA). Since 9/11, the threat and targeting patterns 
of transnational terrorism such as Al Qaeda and its allies have broadened; out-of-area attacks of 
groups who have a local agenda but are loosely affiliated with Al Qaeda became more frequent.[9] 
Apparently, partly supported by international drivers such as the global rise of radical Islamism 
and the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, some conflict-generated groups, for example in Chechnya 
and Algeria, which were originally local in nature, are linking up with organizations outside their 
immediate area of conflict. Although domestic terrorism is probably a more widespread 
phenomenon than international terrorism, a number of contemporary terrorist organizations now 
operate exclusively on an international scale. Many terrorist groups are now motivated by 
transnational or transcendental associations, which pushed them to circumvent limitations 
imposed by national boundaries in the 1980s and 1990s.[10]  
The figures from RAND/MIPT database, the preferred source of quantitative data about terrorism 
for journalists, publicists, essayist and social scientists around the world, support these findings. 
Overall, the data indicate that for the 119 BTI countries terrorist activities have increased in recent 
years, both in respect to terrorist activity and intensity of attacks. 
Figure 4: Trends in Terrorism in 119 countries (2001-2005*)  
 
* January 1, 2001-August 31, 2005; casualties include injured and fatalities.  
The statistics from RAND/MIPT database count any incident as terrorist incident that confirm to 
the following definition of terrorism: Terrorism is violence, or the threat of violence, calculated to 
create an atmosphere of fear and alarm. These acts are designed to coerce others into actions 
they would not otherwise undertake, or refrain from actions they desired to take. All terrorist acts 
are crimes. Many would also be violation of the rules of war if a state of war existed. This violence 
or threat of violence is generally directed against civilian targets. The motives of all terrorists are 
political, and terrorist actions are generally carried out in a way that will achieve maximum 
publicity. Unlike other criminal acts, terrorists often claim credit for their acts. Finally, terrorist acts 
are intended to produce effects beyond the immediate physical damage of the cause, having 
long-term psychological repercussions on a particular target audience. The fear created by 
terrorists may be intended to cause people to exaggerate the strengths of the terrorist and the 
importance of the cause, to provoke governmental overreaction, to discourage dissent, or simply 
to intimidate and thereby enforce compliance with their demands. For further clarification of the 
nature of the incidents included in the statistics, RAND and MIPT have formed a committee that 
oversees, provides guidance and determines criteria for including or not including incidents.  
A geographical breakdown of the RAND/MIPT data reveals three zones of contemporary 
terrorism: Middle East and North Africa (MENA), South- and Southeast Asia and CIS. Further 
analysis of the data reveals that a core group of states can be singled out as the world’s main 
countries of concern: Russia and Chechnya; Colombia; Iraq; and the two conflict triangles India-
Kashmir-Pakistan and Thailand-Philippines-Indonesia. During the period January 2001 to 
September 2005, 81.4 percent of all terrorist incidences reported for the 119 countries surveyed 
in the BTI 2006 were observed in these states and contested territories. With the exception of 
Thailand and Iraq, where insurgency and non-state terrorism are recent developments, these 
areas were already global hotbeds of terrorism in the BTI 2003. 
Figure 5: Regional Patterns of Terrorism (2001-2005, Incidents) 
 Source: RAND/MIPT Terrorism Knowledge Base, accessed September 9, 2005.  
Religious, transnational terrorism bears little relevance for Latin America, East Central Europe 
and the African sub-regions. Although attempts by various persons and groups allegedly affiliated 
with Al Qaeda have effectively established a ‘forward’ presence of the group’s network in various 
areas, and terrorist groups seem to have a presence in parts of South America and East Africa, 
this so-called ‘new terrorism’[11] bears little relevance for virulent violence in Latin America, East 
Central Europe and the African sub-regions. For example, in West and Central Africa, Islamist 
fundamentalism is only a significant political challenge so far in Nigeria and Niger. In most cases, 
terrorism rather is an import from North Africa than a genuinely local phenomenon. Although 
some warlords, such as Charles Taylor, are allegedly involved in Al Qaeda’s network of terrorist 
finance, violent religious extremism is a part of daily life only in Somalia. Warlords along the Horn 
of Africa, however, do not aim to fulfill vague ideologies or religious fantasies, but want to control 
territories and take-over political power first and foremost for economic reasons. The bulk of 
militant Islamist terrorist organizations in East Africa have originated in the area and operate with 
local agendas, often pursuing local, ethnic or clan-based objectives.[12]  
For South-, Southeast and Central Asia and parts of Russia (Chechnya), the ideological spectrum 
of organizations involved in conflict-related terrorism suggests a continuum from secular 
nationalists to transnational religious fundamentalists, such as the radical Islamic organizations 
which adopt Islam as their way of life but do not emphasize nationalism as their ideologies.[13]  
While Al Qaeda and its loose confederation of affiliates have successfully connected with local 
struggles in the Philippines, Indonesia, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Algeria, 
Morocco and Iraq, it is important to note that the genesis of current terrorist movements in Asia 
and CIS has been internal in most cases; often extremism predates the seminal events of 9/11 
and is very much mixed with ethno-religious separatism. A prime example of this is Southeast 
Asia: Only a small segment of extremists in the region can be characterized as transnational 
terrorists. Many of the myriads of groups belong to the more traditional type of conflict-related or 
conflict-generated terrorism, that is, militant groups which were created in the course of an armed 
conflict.[14] Groups of this type are most closely related to ongoing armed conflict and often 
employ various methods of violence. In most cases such groups should be labeled as 
“organizations involved in terrorist activities” rather than “terrorist organizations.”[15] An even 
smaller segment of the extremist groups involved in political violence and terrorism belongs to the 
more recent and still highly contested phenomenon, embodied above all in the 9/11 events of the 
religious-extremist, transnational and highly lethal “global mass-casualty terrorism.”[16]  
However, many of the conflicts in Asia and MENA, which began as nationalist insurgencies, have 
directly or indirectly contributed to the rise of terrorist groups in recent years in two ways. First, 
some Islamist terrorist organizations evolved out of an on going armed conflict. Secondly, and 
more frequently, the shifting kaleidoscope of conflicts and their socioeconomic and political 
consequences create the ‘enabling environment’ for local and transnational terrorist groups to 
grow. In fact, in several countries, terrorist groups are entrenched in a network of decades -old 
insurgencies and organized crime and have learned to take advantage of the region’s porous 
borders and large unregulated areas to rely on smuggling of people, arms, drugs and other forms 
of illicit crime. Furthermore, weak state institutions, ineffective law enforcement agencies, 
rudimentary rule of law and high levels of corruption within public administrations in many areas 
in South-, Southeast Asia, Central Asia, Africa and even in Latin America create the ideal 
operational environment for terrorists to conduct ‘soft’ actions such as training, raising and 
transferring funds for specific operations and money laundering.[17] 
The Impact of Political Violence and Extremism on Democratization and 
Development 
Few would dissent from what John Keane in a recently published essay on democracy and 
violence has stated: political violence “is the greatest enemy of democracy as we know it. 
Violence is anathema to its spirit and substance.”[18] Political extremism and armed conflict, 
fragile states and crumbling societies constitute severe obstacles for democratization and 
sustainable development. Transitions to democracy in post-conflict and violence-torn societies 
occur under extremely obstructive political, social and economic conditions. There are scores of 
refugees and internally displaced persons. State institutions are moribund, and political power is 
concentrated in the hands of military leaders and entrepreneurs of violence. Challenges of 
securing law and order and providing security are unsolved and the warring parties must be 
disarmed, their troops demobilized and reintegrated into civil society; the former combatants must 
be reconciled, while antidemocratic ideologies remain prevalent. Transitional regimes and newly 
elected democratic governments in post-conflict societies often must operate in an environment 
of hostile political factions that requires the most skillful political management and leadership. 
Typically, peace agreements in civil-war countries are the result of a hurting stalemate between 
the warring parties rather than the consequence of a successful elite settlement. As a result, 
peace elections in post-conflict societies are dramatic events, and the stakes are higher than in 
founding elections in other young democracies.[19]  
Most post-conflict societies have neither democratic experiences nor traditions of 
constitutionalism and civil society from which efforts of post-conflict peace-building could benefit. 
Instead, democratic institutions must operate within a culture of violence and intolerance. 
Particularly in post-genocide countries such as Bosnia, Cambodia and Rwanda, the deliberate 
deepening of social conflicts by the autocratic rulers left traditional patterns of internal conflict 
resolution shattered and the sources of social capital drained.[20]  
Concerning economic development, empirical studies show that the reconstruction of civil strife-
torn economies requires an extensive amount of time. In the past, most economies rarely 
recovered within the first decade following a civil war.[21] Markets do not function properly, 
macroeconomics are unstable, and investments in development are impossible as long as civil 
war, organized crime or international drug-trafficking are undermining a society’s political stability. 
Whereas most economic and social resources needed for reconstruction are absent, societies 
suffer from the legacies of war destruction, a genocide trauma, social anomy and from vast 
poverty and underdevelopment. A weak state and rule of law complicate efforts to spur economic 
stabilization, while state capacity building is retarded by the politicization and underdevelopment 
of the bureaucracy and security apparatuses that are bloated far beyond national security needs. 
The experiences of war-torn countries such as Bosnia and Cambodia demonstrate that they do 
not have the ability to develop sustainable growth without extensive international assistance. In 
such contexts, development policy can achieve its desired effects only if its efforts are flanked by 
measures designed to increase these countries’ political stability and security. Extensive 
international aid, however, may create an extreme type of rent-seeking economy, in which the 
accumulation of external rents and its transformation into local rents becomes the most attractive 
form of economic activity.[22] 
The Impact of Democratization and Development on Political Extremism 
and Violence 
This said countries torn apart by collective violence, political extremism and moribund state 
systems are the most unlikely candidates for viable democracy and sustainable development. 
The consequences of democratization and economic reforms for political extremism and violence 
are less apparent, however. In fact, recent research challenges the idea that democratization will 
bring an end to internal violent conflict. Many quantitative studies reveal that the transition from 
authoritarianism to democracy bears an enormous potential for the sudden eruption of violent 
political conflicts. In fact, intrastate bloodletting increased dramatically in many contemporary 
states immediately after authoritarian regimes liberalized.[23]  
Furthermore, there is strong empirical evidence that it is only the fully and deeply institutionalized 
forms of liberal democracy that have a special disposition to peace, whereas political regimes on 
an intermediate level of democracy “are far more likely than autocracies or democracies to be 
challenged by armed conflict, and are less likely to be able either to repress or settle it.”[24] 
Henderson and Singer, Ellingsen and Hegre et al.[25] show that intermediate regimes “are most 
prone to civil war, even when they have had time to stabilize from a regime change. … Compared 
to well-established democracies or autocracies, intermediate regimes have a higher hazard of 
civil war, as do regimes just emerging from a political transition.”[26] Similarly, Jack Snyder, 
Martha Reynal-Querol, and Demet Mousseau conclude, that political transition either from or 
towards authoritarianism has a high probability of deepening political extremism and violence.[27]  
The findings of the BTI 2006 report support the assumption that intermediate political regimes are 
particularly prone for intrastate armed conflict. Combined, moderate autocracies and defective 
democracies account for 98 of the 145 conflicts in the 119 BTI countries. The likelihood of 
conflicts occurring in defective democracies is more than three and a half times greater than in 
fully institutionalized democracies. All intermediary regimes combined have a 20 percent higher 
chance for intrastate conflict than autocracies. However, armed conflicts in autocracies seem to 
be more violent than in other regime types. While there was not a single high-intensity conflict in 
developed democracies, autocracies account for 16 of the 33 high-intensity conflicts. 
Figure 6: Status of Political Transformation and Conflicts 
 
Even stronger is the correlation between level of economic transformation and conflict. In 2004, 
21 or 14.4 percent of all conflicts and only seven (8.9 percent) of all violent conflicts occurred in 
developed or functioning market economies; not a single armed conflict occurred in a country with 
a developed market economy. In 2004, the likelihood of conflicts occurring in deficient market-
economies was more than two times higher than in developed economies, and more than one 
and a half time higher than in low or rudimentarily developed market economies. In addition, 
armed conflicts are the more likely the lower the level of market-economic transformation.  
Figure 7: Status of Economic Transformation and Conflicts 
 
The general argument concerning the higher vulnerability of transitional regimes and polities on 
an intermediate level of democracy to some extent holds true with reference to terrorism. 
Comparing the BTI data on transformation to democracy and the RAND/MIPT terrorism data 
reveals that defective democracies by far are the most terrorism-prone in the world: countries in 
some intermediate range of democracy index are shown to be more prone to terrorism than 
countries with a high democracy status or countries with highly authoritarian regimes. 
Figure 8: Status of Political Transformation and Terrorism (2001-2005, without Iraq)  
 
Causes of Political Violence  
The BTI 2006 survey shows that collective violence and political extremism are not caused by 
any single factor. Rather, our findings support the conclusion that in most cases violence and 
extremism is the result of a country-specific combination of several contentious religious, cultural, 
economic and political factors.  
It is a widely held belief that poverty and economic deprivation are main causes for political 
violence in many countries in the world, particularly where they overlap with ethnic cleavages. 
However, the role of grievance as a driver of political violence is subject to controversial debates 
in conflict studies. The findings of the BTI 2006 and other current studies demonstrate that 
perceived grievance motivation—particularly social inequality—actually influence violence levels. 
However, political violence and extremism such as terrorism are never a mere extension of 
poverty or underdevelopment. Many societies are both poor and backward but do not give rise to 
terrorism or other forms of political violence. Rather, terrorism grows in societies dramatically 
affected by unbalanced or failed socio-economic and incomplete political modernization. Thus the 
roots of terrorism and other forms of political violence are always socio-economic rather than 
purely economic.[28] The likelihood that grievances induced by social inequality and economic 
deprivation will lead to violent political protests is also mitigated by other factors such as: a low 
degree of trust in political authorities combined with a high degree of belief that the use of 
violence by dissident groups in the past has helped their course; semi-repressive political 
structures in intermediate political regimes; defects of the democratic order such as low 
accountability and shallow patterns of political representation; and ‘state weakness.’[29]  
Furthermore, ethnic heterogeneity and conflict between ethnic groups is often viewed as another 
primary source for political extremism and violence, particularly during processes of political 
transition and in new democracies.[30] In fact, Ted Gurr, Jack Snyder and others have argued 
that political liberalization may provide political incentives for ethno-nationalist political 
entrepreneurs to engage in political tactics such as ethnic outbidding and utilizing democratic 
procedures for establishing an “ethnic democracy” in which the majority suppresses the minority 
population.[31] Similarly, Heller states that political opening in ethnically heterogenic societies 
“has often produced a vicious cycle in which the ineffectiveness of formal democracy procedures 
increased social tensions, which in turn trigger autocratic political responses and ‘movements of 
rage.’”[32] This, in turn, may create an ethnic security dilemma, in which competition between 
ethnic groups for control of the government in order to increase on group’s security tend to leave 
all ethnic groups worse off.  
However, the results of the BTI 2006 and other empirical studies do not support the view, that 
ethnicity per se is a cause for political violence. Rather, the findings of our survey are 
inconclusive. The scope of political violence in ethnically divided societies ranges from relatively 
peaceful coexistence to outright civil war. The country reports of the BTI 2006 strongly indicate 
that ethnicity is a primary source for political mobilization which political entrepreneurs exploit for 
their struggle for political or economic power within the boundaries of the post-colonial state 
rather than a root cause of organized violence. For example, the rejection of citizenship for first- 
and second-generation immigrants in Côte d’Ivoire may well be characterized as instrumental 
ethno-nationalist extremism. The conflict between Hutu and Tutsi in Burundi und Rwanda with its 
extension into Eastern Congo belongs to a similar category. In countries such as the Congo, 
resource-richness often becomes a curse, because as a source of grievance it causes conflicts; 
simultaneously, it is also a source of finance for the warring parties often prolonging conflict. 
Resources most frequently linked to civil conflict in this and other world regions are diamonds and 
other gemstones, oil and natural gas, timber and illicit drugs.[33] In the terminology of Collier and 
Hoeffler[34], in these cases, greed and economic viability have stronger explanatory power than 
grievance. In addition, in some conflicts such as the genocide in Rwanda, economic viability 
combines with factors of environmental scarcity which produce collective property conflicts 
between ethnic groups within one state.[35]  
It thus appears that political violence is not a function of socio-economic deprivation or 
inexplicable and fixed primordial elements, but a combination of various factors. Following this 
assumption, it is particularly important whether political institutions have been sufficiently adapted 
to the ethnic diversity of the population.[36] Regarding the institutional capability of a political 
system for consensus-building and conflict management, three basic institutional aspects are 
relevant: the nature of the executive; the type of electoral system; and the distribution of power 
between central government and subunits.  
Concerning the nature of the executive, the argument is that presidential systems, especially in 
emerging democracies, have a detrimental effect on the inclusiveness of political systems. This is 
particularly true in countries, where presidential government is combined with majoritarian 
political institutions which nurture the transformation of political conflict into political violence. On 
the other hand, ethnic rebellion is remarkably lower among parliamentary regimes than among 
(semi-)presidential systems. Furthermore, the results of Alonso and Ruiz, for example, show that 
the more fragmented the party system, the higher the chances for the ethnic minority opposition 
to influence decision-making. Therefore, they conclude that effective parliamentary representation 
is the institutional key to prevent ethnic minority rebellions.[37]  
The issue of effective representation of minorities concerns the second institutional aspect of 
conflict management, the introduction of an electoral system which provides a high degree of 
political inclusiveness and incentives for political parties to form political coalitions across ethnic, 
regional or other social or economic cleavages. In this context, many empirical studies prove that 
the electoral system is the most relevant institutional variable for nurturing or preventing ethnic 
violence in multiethnic societies. While proportional representation (PR) electoral formulas have a 
lower probability of group rebellion, ethnic conflict is more likely in political systems utilizing 
majoritarian electoral formulas.[38] Already in 1965, historian and political scientist W. A. Lewis 
has characterized the relationship between plurality systems and ethnic conflict as follows: “the 
surest way to kill the idea of democracy in a plural society is to adopt the Anglo-American 
electoral system of first-past-the-post.”[39]  
Third, Federalism that performs the special function of granting autonomy to ethnic minorities 
certainly is a political structure that accommodates ethnic conflicts. However, territorial federalism 
(in contrast to non-territorial or “cultural” federalism) is associated with decentralized government. 
In weak states, decentralization or even regional autonomy may aggravate problems of 
governance, particularly if it provides opportunities for institutional gridlocks and utilization of state 
revenues by local elites for purposes of political patronage. It may increase grievances borne of 
inconsistencies in the distribution of natural resources and revenues between provinces or 
regions. If the political boundaries of federal states are drawn so as to approximate the social 
boundaries, ethnic heterogeneity in the federation’s population is transformed into a high degree 
of homogeneity at the level of the component units. However, this may increase the risk of 
emerging territorially recognized political fiefdoms of leaders of ethnic groups, and a further 
alienation between ethnic groups.[40] Therefore, territorial federalism is a double-edged sword. 
On the one hand, ethnic rebellion and minority violence is significantly less likely in federal 
systems than in unitary systems.[41] On the other hand, the institutional make-up of a certain 
type of federalism matters; under some circumstances, federalism may negatively impact other 
aspects of political and economic transformation.  
Overall, however, empirical evidence suggests that parliamentary systems and PR electoral 
systems plus federalism (where appropriate) are better suited for the political management of 
deep rooted conflicts in ethnically or otherwise deeply divided societies than other institutional 
settings, particularly than majoritarian institutions such as unitary state, unicameral parliaments, 
plurality systems, and weak constitutional constraints on executive power, which provide little 
incentives for power sharing. In a nutshell, establishing consensus-oriented forms of democracy 
offer better institutional solutions for the problems of conflict and violence in plural societies than 
Westminster-style, majoritarian democracy which is not only ‘undemocratic’ in tendency, but also 
outright destabilizing. Minorities might feel permanently excluded from politics and therefore may 
withdraw their support for the democratic system. Because of its tendency to exclude minorities, 
this type of democracy is acceptable under two conditions only:[42] the status of the minority is 
not permanent; and the division between majority and minority does not lead to social and 
political polarization. However, new democracies rarely meet both conditions.  
Furthermore, state weakness often is an additional enabler for political violence and extremism in 
conflict-prone countries. It is as much a consequences as an incubator of political violence and 
extremism. However, state weakness, spans a wide variety of forms, reaching from porous and 
ill-defined boundaries, weak central governments, ineffective security services and rule of law to 
the extreme case of state disintegration where central authority has completely collapsed. In 
addition, weak states offer external or transnational terrorist networks opportunities for relocation, 
sanctuary and transshipment of arms and people. Because of mutual ecologies, organized crime, 
guerrilla wars and terrorism are often intertwined and related in complex and diverse ways. 
“Global organized crime, which increasingly links local actors with their transnational counterparts, 
coupled with chronic warfare and insurgency (which yields economic benefits to some of its 
participants) can propel local or regional conflicts into genocidal humanitarian disasters”[43] and 
“chronic ungoverned badlands.”[44] Synthetic nation-states that manifest dictatorial oppression, 
religious conflict, periodic wars and periodically changing borders are especially attractive to 
terrorists and the seedbeds of transnational terrorism.[45] 
Combating Political Extremism and Democracy  
This last point turns us back to the issue of terrorism, which is at the top of the agenda in Western 
countries. Although a detailed engagement with the debate over the relationship between 
terrorism, counterterrorism and democracy is beyond the BTI 2006 survey, the experiences with 
terrorism in many of the countries surveyed suggest that terrorism is confronting liberal 
democracies with a threefold challenge.  
Firstly, the normative challenge: terrorism constitutes a fundamental violation of the normative 
core principles of liberal democracy. In liberal democracies, consensus is the fruit of political 
bargaining based upon a give-and-take process between ethnic, political, religious, cultural and 
linguistic groups, which recognize the relativity of the truth and need to balance various interests. 
For terrorists, particularly religious extremists, however the Truth is one of eternal, an either-or 
affair, anchored in a demand for everything now.[46]  
Secondly, liberal democracies are facing the challenge of democratic self-constraint. Commitment 
to upholding individual human rights is inextricably linked to the principles of democracy and the 
rule of law; democracies must combat terrorism while remaining true of the liberal founding vision 
of a democratic constitutional order. This said, some effective counterterrorism measures 
constitute unacceptable violations of individual rights, civil liberties, and the principle of limited 
rule.[47] Others are permissible, but bear enormous threats to the quality of democracy if not 
utilized in a restrictive manner and subject of judicial review. Whereas evidence of combating 
terrorism in Europe and Japan in the 1960s to 1980s suggests that fully established liberal 
democracies are impressively successful in containing political extremism, and in limiting its 
political damage,[48] terrorism in young, not yet firmly consolidated democracies can be pivotal in 
undermining the political regime by aggravating strains and weakening fault lines.[49] In several 
countries in the past, both terrorist violence and state repression leaves two basic purposes of the 
state unfulfilled: security and integration. Citizen confidence declined as a consequence, whereas 
democratic instability increased, as Jennifer Holmes study on terrorism and democratic stability in 
Uruguay, Peru and Spain suggests.[50]  
Thirdly, democracies must avoid unintended negative side-effects of counterterrorism. Because 
terrorists aim to legitimize their actions, governments when combating terrorism, must be 
concerned with both the legitimacy and effectiveness of their policies.[51] Efforts to deal with 
violent terrorists consisting of turning violence back onto them risk initiating a continuing tit-for-tat 
exchange which tends to take the conflict further away from peaceful settlement of differences, 
especially when the violence used against terrorists has innocent civilian victims.[52] The net 
effect of indiscriminate force and repression is to promote recruitment into terrorist organizations, 
particularly where terrorist organizations are affiliated with a particular ethnic or religious 
community. Therefore, the argument that combating terrorism requires using terrorist methods is 
not only morally abhorrent but politically disastrous.[53] If democracies adopt responses to 
terrorism which are at odds with their basic values of human rights, democracy and the rule of law, 
they will not only lose the moral high ground, they will help to create new generations of 
extremists, filled with hatred of the government of the day and the democratic system per se.  
To some extent democratic governments’ emphasize on short-term reactive military measures in 
many countries is understandable. A long-term preventive strategy that emphasizes the need to 
address the root causes of conflict and terrorism may take decades to produce noticeable results. 
In the meantime, the scale and scope of the terrorist threat faced by many states today are such 
that this problem cannot wait so long to be solved and must be addressed as soon as possible. In 
addition, democratically elected governments face pressure from electoral cycles, the public and 
media, or, in less-developed countries, from lack of resources which prevent democratic 
authorities from prioritizing the long-term need to address the social, economic and political roots 
causes.[54] But for a viable solution to the problem of insurgency and terrorism in many countries 
a strategy that combines short-term measures focusing on stabilizing the security situation with a 
long-term approach that redresses the political, cultural, and economic root causes of the 
problem is needed.  
Such a strategy must start with a broad recognition in government of the need to address the 
disaffection from which both militants and extremists are drawing strength. One crucial short-term 
measure is the strengthening of formal state institutions where state weakness provides an 
enabling environment for the rise of political extremists.[55] Long-term aspect should emphasize 
development, building economic institutions and political reforms. This is absolutely essential as a 
far-reaching way to address the root causes of the conflict that generate terrorism; but tying 
development directly to concrete anti-terrorist needs seems to be more problematic.  
Conclusions  
The United States, the European Union, Japan, the United Nations and international donor 
agencies have a great responsibility for and influence on shaping the course of political violence 
and extremism in many developing countries. They can utilize several policy tools to increase the 
opportunity costs both of repressive government policies and the violent pursuit of objectives by 
non-state actors, and they can provide some incentives for domestic parties to reach peaceful 
solutions to social conflict. However, the increasing number of violent conflicts in the world in the 
past years, the rising levels of political extremism in some world regions and various policy 
failures in the GWOT indicate that the learning curve of Western governments may be flat. While 
conflict prevention has become an increasingly central issue in foreign and security policy, 
Western governments and international agencies have not made significant progress in conflict 
prevention. Simultaneously, however, it appears that international actors have made greater 
advancement in managing post-conflict situations, especially when it comes to economic 
reconstruction. The experiences from such different cases like Bosnia, Kosovo, Macedonia, 
Cambodia, East Timor, Liberia, and Sierra Leone prove that while none of the countries is an 
overwhelming success of peace-building and democratization, post-conflict reconstruction and 
stabilization has achieved significant successes in all countries.  
But the more ambitious cases of democratization and state-building under aegis of an 
international transitional authority, with varying degree of supervisory, executive, or administrative 
authority and effective international capacity, such as in Cambodia and East Timor, also point to 
some crucial limits for external engagement. Viewed from the perspective of sustainable 
democratic development, such an approach may create unintended negative side-effects. For 
example, international interim governments, such as the UN transitional authorities in Cambodia 
and East Timor, bear a double accountability: They are de jure accountable to the external 
principal organizing, controlling and financing its mission. In the case of an UN-led interim 
government, the UN Secretariat and the Security Council is the principal. De facto, however, the 
interim government also is accountable to the domestic elites and the people of the territory it is 
ruling and for whom it has to construct a self-sustainable democratic system. Apparently, this may 
lead to tensions between both aspects of accountability which bear obstructive potential for 
democratization. For example, there is a trade-off between the short -term needs to provide 
security, establishing an effective administration, assisting in the development of civil and social 
services, and the long-term strategic objective of supporting capacity building and preparing a 
country for democratic self-rule.  
The ultimate responsibility in conflict prevention and post-conflict reconstruction, however, is with 
domestic actors, particularly the political leadership. The historical experiences of some plural 
societies prove that it may be possible to mitigate conflict by inventing social and political 
institutions that help to accommodate the interests of different groups in a society. Whether social 
divisions transform into collective violence or not is a question of leadership quality and political 
management. Interethnic elite pacts, social segmentation and corporatism, consociational 
practices, parliamentary government, PR electoral systems, and federalism where appropriate 
are informal and formal institutional choices that may support the capability of political systems to 
prevent the outburst of political violence and extremism and to induce peaceful solutions to armed 
conflicts. Important is the combination of management skills, the political will of governments and 
non-state actors to seek a broader consensus in society, social institutions and political 
institutional arrangements.  
One last point: we must keep in mind that often political violence and extremism is a 
consequence of a complicated manifestation of history, experience, ideology and animosities. For 
a variety of reasons discussed in previous sections, these factors coalesce to exacerbate 
tensions and produce a rebelling reaction at some point in time. Admittedly, national economic 
sclerosis; exploitative economic policies that have deprived indigenous populations of a large 
percentage of ‘their’ wealth; unequal patterns of development, blocked modernization and fragile 
political institutions; a moribund state system and the transnational contagion effects of civil strife 
and terrorism; the persistent demographic factors that can motivate political extremism[56]; and 
the global expansion of radical-fundamentalist religious beliefs constitute enormous challenges 
even for the most skillful political management and leadership. In many countries, tackling these 
issues and finding viable solutions to the problems of political violence and extremism may take 
decades. For successful transformation to consolidated democracy and sustainable economic 
development, however, it is a condition sine qua non..  
For more insights into contemporary international security issues, see our Strategic Insights 
home page. 
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